The past in archaeology does not emerge as a present reality but becomes accessible through materially transformed remains. Thus, archaeological knowledge is constituted within the epistemic distance between surviving traces and the absent reality of the past. The research problem arises from this distance: evidence is not fully determinate with respect to explanations, while the inferential mediation between data and historical claims often remains implicit. Consequently, dominant narratives may acquire an unwarranted status of certainty without confronting rival possibilities. This study asks what place abduction occupies within the architecture of archaeological knowledge and how its capacities can be formulated in the production, comparison, and revision of explanations. Using a descriptive-analytical method and conceptual-comparative analysis of sources in the philosophy of science, logic, and theoretical archaeology, the study examines forms of abduction in terms of hypothesis generation, evidential relations, evaluation of alternatives, representation of uncertainty, and revision. The findings show that Peircean abduction, as a logic of hypothesis generation, should be distinguished from “inference to the best explanation” as a logic of comparative hypothesis evaluation. Four formulations are identified: logic-based abduction, set-covering abduction, abductive validation, and abduction in subjective logic. These are not mutually exclusive models but complementary dimensions of a process extending from hypothesis formation and evidential coverage to the assessment of alternatives, articulation of uncertainty, and revision. The study argues that abduction, alongside deduction and induction, constitutes a fundamental pillar of archaeological epistemology. It transforms silent remains into evidence-responsive narratives while introducing rival hypotheses that prevent interpretive closure. Under evidential constraints and intersubjective criticism, this framework can limit interpretive bias and enable “evidentially constrained interpretive plurality” without lapsing into unrestricted relativism. The article’s originality lies in functionally integrating these four formulations within a structured and applicable framework and reconsidering their implications for cultivating a critical research disposition in archaeology.